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We conduct field experiments in a large real-world social network to examine why decision makers
treat friends more generously than strangers. Subjects are asked to divide surplus between themselves
and named partners at various social distances, where only one of the decisions is implemented. In
order to separate altruistic and future interaction motives, we implement an anonymous treatment where
neither player is told at the end of the experiment which decision was selected for payment and a non-anonymous
treatment where both players are told. Moreover, we include both games where transfers increase and
decrease social surplus to distinguish between different future interaction channels including signaling
one's generosity and enforced reciprocity, where the decision maker treats the partner to a favor because
she can expect it to be repaid in the future. We can decompose altruistic preferences into baseline altruism
towards any partner and directed altruism towards friends. Decision makers vary widely in their baseline
altruism, but pass at least 50 percent more surplus to friends compared to strangers when decision
making is anonymous. Under non-anonymity, transfers to friends increase by an extra 24 percent relative
to strangers, but only in games where transfers increase social surplus. This effect increases with density
of the network structure between both players, but does not depend on the average amount of time
spent together each week. Our findings are well explained by enforced reciprocity, but not by signaling
or preference-based reciprocity. We also find that partners' expectations are well calibrated to directed
altruism, but that they ignore decision makers' baseline altruism. Partners with high baseline altruism
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“Friendship is essentially a partnership.” – Aristotle (4th century B.C.)
1 Introduction
Friends tend to treat us better than strangers. A signiﬁcant share of team production therefore
evolves around pre-existing social relationships. For example, 53 percent of all start-ups in the
US have more than one owner and 23 percent of these jointly owned start-ups have at least one
friend as co-owner (Davidsson and Reynolds 2005). Our objective in this paper is to answer
the question: how much is it worth to have a friend rather than a stranger make payoﬀ-relevant
decisions and what channels make a friend valuable?
While most experimental research has focused on altruism between strangers, it is natural
to assume that the strength of altruism varies with social distance. Increased altruism helps
align the interests of a decision maker and her partner in an economic relationship. Aside
from increased altruism, friendships can be valuable because there is a greater prospect of
future interaction with friends compared to strangers. Economic theory suggests at least three
mechanisms which induce the decision maker to treat the partner more generously when there is
a prospect of future interaction. First, the decision maker can grant favors because she expects
the partner to repay them in the future. We call this the enforced reciprocity mechanism.
Second, the possibility of future interaction gives incentives for the decision maker to signal
her type to the partner (Benabou and Tirole 2006). Third, psychological game theory has
modeled preference-based reciprocity where decision makers behave generously because they
expect the partner to behave kindly towards them in some future interaction and they derive
utility from rewarding kind behavior (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).
We use ﬁeld experiments to (a) disentangle the directed altruism from the future interac-
tion channel, (b) determine the absolute and relative strength of both eﬀects and (c) to pin
down the mechanism behind the repeated interaction channel. Our experimental design has
two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we map a large real-world social network. In the second stage we
invite a randomly selected sample of subjects from this network to play the role of a decision
maker who repeatedly over a period of one to two weeks divides surplus between herself and
partners at various social distances plus a “nameless” partner. In our ﬁrst ﬁeld experiment,
decision makers play modiﬁed dictator games with diﬀerent exchange rates such that in some
games passing tokens to the partner increases social surplus and in other games it decreases
social surplus. The second ﬁeld experiment is a novel helping game where decision makers
have to choose how much they would be maximally willing to pay to increase the payoﬀ of
2the partner by a ﬁxed amount. While each decision maker makes multiple decisions, only one
of them is randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. For each match a
decision maker makes both an anonymous and a non-anonymous decision. In the anonymous
treatment, no player is told at the end of the experiment which of the matches was selected
for payment, while in the non-anonymous treatment both players are informed about the se-
lected decision maker/partner match and the decision maker’s action. The anonymous and
non-anonymous treatments allow us to separate directed altruism from future interaction chan-
nels. By including both games where giving is eﬃcient and ineﬃcient, we can distinguish the
signaling mechanism from reciprocity mechanisms: decision makers motivated by reciprocity
should only transfer more surplus under non-anonymity to the socially close partner if giving
is eﬃcient. In contrast, decision makers who want to signal their generosity to the partner
should always transfer more surplus.
In the anonymous treatment, we ﬁnd that a decision maker’s choice for a named partner is
strongly determined by (a) her baseline altruism towards a nameless partner and (b) directed
altruism towards socially close partners. In the dictator game experiment each token increase
in generosity towards a nameless player is associated with approximately a one token increase
in generosity towards any named player. This correlation is remarkable because nameless and
named decisions were taken one week apart. Controlling for their baseline altruism, decision
makers are substantially more generous towards friends: subjects pass at least 50 percent
more surplus to friends compared to strangers when decision making is anonymous. This eﬀect
declines for indirect friends but can still be substantial for second-order friends. We do not ﬁnd
that standard demographic variables, such as gender of either the decision maker or the partner
have signiﬁcant eﬀects. We also collect data on partners’ expectations of how generous they
expect (named) decision makers at various social distances to behave. We ﬁnd that partners’
expectations are well calibrated to directed altruism: their expectations decrease with social
distance at approximately the correct rate. However, there is no evidence that a partner
takes a decision maker’s baseline altruism towards nameless players into account when forming
expectations. This is true even if partner and decision maker are socially close. Nevertheless,
partners with high baseline altruism are treated substantially better by their friends than
subjects with low baseline altruism because baseline altruism of direct social neighbors is
positively correlated. It therefore appears that while we seek out friends with similar altruistic
preferences as ourselves, we base our beliefs about the decision maker’s generosity mainly on
social distance.
When we compare non-anonymous and anonymous decision making, we ﬁnd that transfers
to a friend versus a stranger increase by an additional 24 percent only if such transfers increase
3social surplus. This is true, for example, in a dictator game where tokens are worth more to
the partner than to the decision maker. This means that an important characteristic that
distinguishes between the altruistic motivation for giving and the eﬀect of observability within
a social network is that the altruistic eﬀect leads to more equitable distributions (that may
diminish eﬃciency), while observability pushes allocations towards eﬃciency.
Just as in the case of directed altruism the eﬀect declines with social distance and is not
aﬀected by demographic characteristics of the decision maker or the partner. We also ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of non-anonymity and directed altruism towards friends are substitutes: the
more altruistic the decision maker the lower are the extra transfers under non-anonymity. Our
experimental ﬁndings can be explained by a theory of enforced reciprocity based on Mobius and
Szeidl (2006) where the decision maker treats friends under non-anonymity to extra “favors”
because she expects them to be repaid in the future. In contrast, the signaling model of
Benabou and Tirole (2006) predicts excess transfers to friends across all games even when
such transfers decrease social surplus. We cannot use the same test to distinguish the favors
mechanism from preference-based reciprocity models which make similar predictions. However,
our enforced-reciprocity model also predicts a role for network structure: a measure of local
network density - maximum network ﬂow between decision maker and partner - determines
the decision maker’s ability to make the partner repay a favor. Consistent with this model,
we ﬁnd that network ﬂow predicts the decision maker’s generosity under non-anonymity even
after controlling for social distance. One might expect that in locally dense networks friends
see each other more frequently and have more opportunities for reciprocation. As it turns
out, our ﬁnding is not just an artifact of network ﬂow being a proxy for the amount of time a
decision maker spends with a partner. For direct friends, we also collect data on the average
amount of time spent together each week. Network ﬂow is essentially uncorrelated with time
spent together in our data set and it is network ﬂow rather than time spent together that
predicts generosity under non-anonymity suggesting that our results are driven by enforced
rather than preference-based reciprocity.
Our paper relates to a rich experimental and theoretical literature on other-regarding pref-
erences and cooperation. Prosocial behavior in the lab of varying magnitudes has been ob-
served in a variety of contexts (see Camerer (2003) for an extensive survey). Our directed
altruism channel is a natural reﬁnement of preference-based altruism as modeled by Andreoni
(1990) in his “warm glow” model or Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
and Charness and Rabin (2002) who focus on preferences over payoﬀ distributions. In the lab,
experiments on prosocial behavior with reduced anonymity have typically involved revealing
the ethnic group or gender of the partner Fershtman and Gneezy (2001). In subsequent re-
4search Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp, and Yariv (2007) have adopted the anonymous
treatment of our experimental design (standard dictator game) and also ﬁnd strong evidence
for directed altruism in a school network of teenage girls (also see Pablo Braas-Garza, Ramon
Cobo-Reyes, Maria Paz Espinosa, Jimnez, and Ponti (2006) for experimental data with Eu-
ropean university students). There are very few experimental papers that explicitly rely on
subjects’ ongoing relationships with their friends. A notable exception is the seminal paper of
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) who also non-anonymously match subjects
at various social distances to play a trust game. To the best of our knowledge our design is
the ﬁrst within-subject design which attempts to distinguish between directed altruism and
future interaction eﬀects.
In an important methodological advance, our two experiments were completely web-based.
This ensured very high participation rates of between 42 percent and 71 percent which was
crucial for generating a suﬃcient number of matches between direct friends during the course
of the experiment. Our experiment also pioneers various techniques to conduct social network
surveys online which we have already applied to a number of other projects and which we hope
will prove useful to other researchers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theory frame-
work where we review the testable implications of various repeated game mechanisms such as
enforced reciprocity, signaling and preference-based reciprocity. The experimental design is
described in section 3. In section 4 we summarize the main features of the data. Our empirical
results on directed altruism are presented in section 5 and section 6 contains our comparison
of decision making under anonymity and non-anonymity.
2T h e o r y
We start with a simple one-period model of directed altruism and then add a second period in
which the partner learns the decision maker’s action from the ﬁrst period and can react to it.
2.1 Directed Altruism Channel
We assume that there is a decision maker M and a partner P who are embedded in a social
network which consists of a set of nodes and edges connecting social neighbors. We calculate
the social distance DMP between the decision maker and the partner as the shortest path
connecting them: for example, two direct friends have social distance 1 while friends of a
friend are distance 2 apart.
The decision maker chooses an action x from some set X =[ 0 ,x max]. This action aﬀects
5both the decision maker’s payoﬀ πM (x) as well as the partner’s payoﬀ πP (x). We assume that
the decision maker’s payoﬀ is decreasing in action x while the partner’s payoﬀ is increasing in
x - hence we say that the decision is “more generous” if she chooses a higher x.W e d e n o t e
the total social surplus generated by the decision maker’s action with S(x)=πM(x)+πP(x)
and distinguish three important important types of games:
Deﬁnition 1 Giving is eﬃcient (ineﬃcient) in the game played between decision maker and
partner if total surplus is increasing (decreasing) in the action x. Giving is neutral if S(x) is
constant.
For example, in the classic dictator game altruism is neutral. For modiﬁed dictator games as
studied in Andreoni and Miller (2002) where tokens are worth more to the partner compared to
the decision maker giving is eﬃcient. When the tokens are worth less to the partner compared
to the agent giving is ineﬃcient.
We assume for now that the decision maker’s choice x∗
MP remains unknown to the partner -
this will correspond to the anonymous treatment in our experiment. We adapt the speciﬁcation
of Andreoni and Miller (2002) to model the action of a rational decision-maker with altruistic
utility:
x∗
MP =a r gm a x
x
u(πM(x),π P(x);γMP)( 1 )
We make the technical assumption that u(·) is quasi-supermodular, strictly increasing and
concave in the decision maker’s own payoﬀ and weakly increasing and concave in the partner’s
payoﬀ. We interpret γMP as the decision maker’s altruism towards the partner and we assume
that ∂2u/∂πM∂γMP < 0a n d∂2u/∂πP∂γMP > 0 such that the decision maker’s action is
always increasing with altruism. We also adopt the tie-breaking assumption that if the decision
maker is indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent actions she will choose the action that gives the
partner a higher material payoﬀ.
We allow altruism to depend on social distance:
γMP = γ1DMP + γM (2)
We think of γM as baseline altruistic type of the decision maker M and of γ1 as the strength
of directed altruism.1
In our experiments we observe for each decision maker/partner match the decision maker’s
action x∗
MP and from our baseline survey we know social distance DMP as well as basic
1We do not take a position on whether altruism is the result of “warm glow” as in Andreoni (1990) or arises
from preferences over payoﬀ distributions as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Charness and Rabin (2002).
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have a proxy for the decision maker’s baseline type since we ask her to make a decision for
nameless partner. Since we ask each decision maker for multiple decisions we can use random
eﬀects to capture unobserved characteristics of the decision maker. We will estimate variants
of the following empirical model
x∗
MP = αZ + γ1DMP + γM +  MP (3)
where Z are the characteristics of the decision maker and the partner and γM is a random
eﬀect for each decision maker. We use social distance dummies to capture the directed altruism
eﬀect whose magnitude we will compare to the average decision towards an anonymous player.
2.2 Future Interaction Channel: Enforced Reciprocity
We capture the eﬀects of future interaction between decision maker and partner by adding
a second period to our basic model where the partner observes the decision maker’s action
from the ﬁrst period and reacts to it. This allows us to examine three mechanisms which
provide incentives for the decision maker to increase her action above her preferred choice
x∗
MP: enforced reciprocity, signaling and preference-based reciprocity. We start out analysis
with a simple model of enforced reciprocity based on recent work by Mobius and Szeidl (2006)
who provide a tractable model for capturing repeated game eﬀects in social networks.
2.2.1 Basic Enforced Reciprocity Model
We divide the second period into three stages as shown in ﬁgure 1. In stage 2.1 the decision
maker can state a positive number F which we interpret as “favor” for which the decision maker
requests repayment and which satisﬁes 0 ≤ F ≤ πM(0)−πM(x). Therefore, the decision maker
cannot claim favors which are larger than the payment loss from acting generously. In stage 2.2
the partner can either “repay” the favor and transfer R = F to the decision maker or choose
not to repay the favor and transfer R = 0. In stage 2.3 the decision maker and the partner
“consume” their friendship and both receive value VMP from it. We interpret VMP as the
present value of the future relationship between decision maker and principal. Not repaying
a favor implies that the relationship between decision maker and principal breaks down and
both receive 0 - otherwise they receive the full value of the relationship.2
2We assume that friendships break down automatically if a favor is not repaid. Mobius and Szeidl (2006) give
the borrower a choice between breaking oﬀ a relationship or continuing. In their model breaking a relationship
after non-payment is optimal because it signals to the lender that the borrower no longer values their relationship.















We include the payoﬀs from both periods in the decision maker’s altruistic utility function
u(·) which we deﬁned in the previous section:3
u(πM(x)+R + I(R,F)VMP,π P(x) − R + I(R,F)VMP;γMP)( 4 )
The indicator function I(R,F)e q u a l s1i fR = F and is zero otherwise. For simplicity we
assume that the partner has selﬁsh preferences:
UP(x,R)=πP(x) − R + I(R,F)VMP (5)
We focus on the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. It is easy to see that the optimal
action of the partner in any SPE is to exactly repay a favor and choose R = F when the
value of his relationship with the decision maker exceeds F a n dt op a y0o t h e r w i s e . S i n c ea
breakdown of the relationship hurts both players the decision maker will only do favors which
are paid in equilibrium. The next theorem characterizes the decision maker’s optimal action
˜ x∗
MP.
Theorem 1 In the enforced reciprocity model the following holds: (1) when giving is eﬃcient
the decision maker takes action ˜ x∗
MP (VMP) which is increasing in VMP and satisﬁes ˜ x∗
MP (0) =
x∗
MP. In the second period the decision maker requests that the partner repays a favor F =
VMP. Both the decision maker’s utility and the partner’s utility increase with relationship value
VMP. (2) When giving is ineﬃcient the decision maker always chooses the same action x∗
MP
as under purely anonymous interaction with the partner.
Proof: see appendix A
We might expect that the decision maker always chooses her action ˜ x∗
MP such that after
accounting for the partner’s repayment R she has the same material payoﬀ πM(x∗
MP) as under
3Assuming altruistic preferences for the partner does not aﬀect our qualitative results. If the partner is
altruistic as well two complications arise. First, he might repay favors which are greater than VMP because he
takes the utility loss of the decision maker from breaking the relationship into account. Second, the partner
might repay parts of large favors voluntarily.
8anonymous decision-making. However, the decision maker will generally shade down her action
because her marginal utility of the partner’s consumption decreases when the partner is made
better oﬀ.
Lemma 1 Directed altruism and favors are substitutes in the sense that an altruistic decision
maker (x∗
MP > 0) chooses ˜ x∗




A perfectly selﬁsh decision maker chooses ˜ x∗
MP = xMP.
Proof: see appendix A
In the case of a dictator game where giving is eﬃcient the above result implies that a perfectly
selﬁsh decision maker will increase the number of tokens she passes under non-anonymity more
than an altruistic decision maker.
2.2.2 Relationship Value and Network Flow
Since we cannot directly observe VMP we proxy for it in our empirical analysis in two ways.
First, we expect that relationship value decreases with social distance because a decision maker
is more likely to interact with a socially close partner in the future. Therefore we will use social
distance as a proxy for relationship value.
Our second proxy for relationship value is the new maximum network ﬂow measure between
decision maker and partner which was recently introduced by Mobius and Szeidl (2006). In
their model the network ﬂow provides an upper limit for amount of money a borrower can
informally obtain from a lender in the social network. Formally, the maximum network ﬂow
is deﬁned as follows: all direct friendship links are assigned a relationship value of 1. A ﬂow
from partner to decision maker is a set of transfers Fij between any two direct neighbors i and
j within the network such that (a) no transfer exceeds the value of a link and (b) for any agent
other than the partner and the decision maker the individual ﬂows to and from that agent
sum up to 0 (ﬂow preservation). The maximum network ﬂow is the maximum value of the net
ﬂows to the decision maker across all possible ﬂows.
In our context network ﬂow captures the amount of additional social sanction that can be
brought to bear via common friends, which can serve as “collateral” for the favor. That is,
the alternative transfer arrangement works as an informal insurance policy for the decision
maker: if a partner acts selﬁshly the decision maker can still extract a payment F through
common friends who in turn “punish” the partner by extracting the favor from their direct
9relationships to the partner. The maximum network ﬂow measure highlights information about
the network structure which is not reﬂected in the “consumption value” of friendship captured
by the simple social distance measure. Intuitively, the greater the number of distinct paths
connecting the decision maker with the partner the higher the network ﬂow. For example,
sharing a large number of common friends will tend to increase network ﬂow. Network ﬂow
therefore formalizes a common intuition in the sociology literature on social networks that
“dense” networks are important for building trust because they give agents the ability to
engage in informal arrangements (Coleman 1988, Coleman 1990). Figure 2 provides a number
of examples to illustrate the network ﬂow concept and how it diﬀers from social distance.
We can easily embed Mobius and Szeidl’s (2006) model in our framework by adding one
more period after the partner has decided whether to return the favor. If the partner fails to
repay (R = 0) the decision maker can propose an alternative set of transfer Fij involving all
agents in the social network. The net ﬂow to the decision maker,

i FiM, cannot exceed the
initial request F. The transfer arrangement needs to be accepted by all aﬀected agents in the
social network other than the partner. If any transfer Fij between two agents is not made the
relationship between them breaks down. Following Mobius and Szeidl (2006) we say that a set
of transfers is “side-deal proof” if the partner cannot propose an alternative set of transfers to
a subset of agents in the network which would make her strictly better oﬀ and each agent in
the network weakly better oﬀ.
Theorem 2 The largest favor the decision maker can request from the partner and secure
through a side-deal proof transfer arrangement is equal to the maximum network ﬂow.
Proof: see Mobius and Szeidl (2006)
The basic network ﬂow measure can include every member of the social network in the alter-
native transfer arrangement. Surely, for large social networks this assumption is unrealistic.
In his empirical analysis of job search networks Granovetter (1974) found that decision makers
utilize mostly links which are at most a distance K =2t oK =2 .5a w a y . 4 We interpret K
as the “circle of trust” which the decision maker enjoys and use K = 2 when we calculate
network ﬂow as a proxy of relationship value.
2.2.3 Testable Implications of Enforced Reciprocity Model
We will estimate variants of the following empirical model:
˜ x∗
MP = ηZ + θx∗
MP + φVMP + υM +  MP (7)
4We deﬁne the distance of a link ij from an agent k as the average social distance of i to k and j to k.
10Table 1: Testable predictions of of enforced reciprocity, signaling and preference-based reci-
procity models when estimating the empirical model ˜ x∗
MP = ηZ +θx∗
MP +φVMP +υM + MP
Enforced Signaling Preference-based
Reciprocity Reciprocity
Greater generosity towards friends
(φ>0) when giving is eﬃcient Yes Yes Yes
Greater generosity towards friends
(φ>0) when giving is ineﬃcient No Yes No
More altruistic decision makers are rel-
atively less generous towards friends
compared to strangers under non-
anonymity
Yes No Yes5
Maximum network ﬂow is a better pre-
dictor of treating the partner gener-
ously under non-anonymity than social
distance.
Yes No No
We include a random eﬀect υM for each decision maker to control for unobserved heterogeneity
in how the decision maker responds to the prospect of future interaction. In table 1 we
summarize the empirical predictions of the enforced reciprocity model. Theorem 1 implies that
controlling for directed altruism decision makers treat friends more generously than stranger
under non-anonymity (φ>0) only when giving is eﬃcient. We expect this eﬀect to be more
pronounced for more selﬁsh agents (θ<0) and we expect that maximum network ﬂow is a
better proxy for relationship value than social distance.
2.3 Future Interaction Channel: Signaling
In recent work, Benabou and Tirole (2006) analyzed a related two-player model where the
decision maker is concerned about her reputation for generosity. Their theory can provide
an alternative explanation for why decision makers treat friends more generously under non-
anonymity compared to strangers. In their framework individuals care that others think they
are of an altruistic (rather than greedy) type, hence when their action can be observed they
will act more generously in order to generate a good impression.
5Assume a selﬁsh and an altruistic decision maker with the same future interaction probability p(DMP).
Compared to the selﬁsh decision maker the altruist faces a repayment schedule with a ﬂatter slope because the
partner is less nice by returning more tokens. At the same time the marginal return to a token decreases -
therefore the decision maker will reduce his allocation of tokens.
112.3.1 Basic Signaling Model
In order to adapt Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) model to our framework we assume in this
section that the decision maker plays a modiﬁed dictator game with the partner where tokens
have value rM to the decision maker and value rP to the partner. We also assume that she
has a quadratic utility function:




The new parameter γG captures the “greed” of the decision maker. The key feature of Benabou
and Tirole’s (2006) model is that the preference parameters (γG,γ MP) vary between individu-
als: while the decision maker knows her own preferences the partner can infer her preferences
by observing her action in the second period. We will follow Benabou and Tirole (2006) and
focus on the case where (γG,γ MP) are independently and normally distributed with means
(γG,γ(DMP)):
(γG,γ MP) ∼ N (γG,γ(DMP),σ G2,σ2MP,σ G,MP =0 ) ( 9 )
Note, that we allow partners’ mean beliefs about the decision maker’s generosity to depend on
social distance but the precision of beliefs is independent of social distance. This assumption
is vindicated in our empirical analysis where we ﬁnd that partners (correctly) expect socially
close decision makers to be nicer towards them but once we correct for social distance we do
not ﬁnd that partners are any better in predicting niceness of friends compared to predicting
niceness of strangers.
The decision maker cares about being perceived as not greedy (low γG) by the partner in
the second period as well as generous (high γMP). Her combined ﬁrst and second period utility
is therefore:
γG(50 − x)rM + γMPxrP − k
x2






The parameters μG and μMP capture the intensity with which the decision maker cares about
her reputation, as well as the probability with which their actions are observed by the partner.
We would expect that decision makers care more about the beliefs of socially close partners
and we therefore expect that both μG and μMP decrease with social distance.6
Proposition 2 from Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) then yields the optimal action for the
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¿From this expression the main prediction of the signaling model follows:
Proposition 1 In the signaling model decision makers always pass more (fewer) tokens to
socially close versus socially distant partner under non-anonymity compared to anonymity if
they care more (less) about their reputation with socially close agents.
We can also note that the eﬀect of non-anonymity (i.e., the excess giving under non-
anonymity versus anonymity) is independent of the level of altruism. This is in contrast to the
enforced reciprocity model, where altruism and favors are substitutes.
2.3.2 Testable Implications of Signaling Model
Table 1 summarizes the empirical predictions of the signaling model. The main diﬀerence to
the enforced reciprocity model is that the signaling model predicts that decision makers react
similarly in games where giving is eﬃcient and ineﬃcient.
2.4 Future Interaction Channel: Preference-Based Reciprocity
The third channel through which future interaction can aﬀect the decision maker’s action
are reciprocal incentives: an individual wishes to treat kindly (unkindly) those who have
treated/will treat her kindly (unkindly). Since observable actions create the possibility for a
future exchange, the decision maker will treat the partner more kindly because she expects the
partner to be kind to her and wants to reciprocate the kindness (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
2004).
132.4.1 Basic Preference-Based Reciprocity Model
We adapt Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) model of sequential preference-based reci-
procity. As in our enforced reciprocity model we assume that the partner can make a payment
R in the second period after observing the decision maker’s action x. We assume that the
partner can make this payment with probability p(DMP) which is an increasing function of
the social distance between herself and the partner - we think of p simply as the probability
that both agents meet again in the future. The decision maker has the same altruistic utility
function as in our enforced reciprocity model but also has “reciprocal incentives”








πM(x)+ ˆ R(x),π P(x) − ˆ R(x);γM
	




altruistic utility UM(x,R) plus reciprocal incentives
The parameter ψ captures the strength of reciprocal incentives which we assume to be constant
across all decision makers and partners. κM(x, ˆ R(x)) represents the decision maker’s kindness
which is a function of her action x and her belief about the partner’s repayment ˆ R(x):
κM(x, ˆ R(x)) = max






The decision maker is kind if her action gives the partner more than his reference utility which
we deﬁne as his payoﬀ under anonymous decision making.7 Our kindness function is also
non-negative which will guarantee uniqueness of our equilibrium. κP(x, ˆ R(x)) represents the
decision maker’s beliefs about the partner’s intended kindness:
κP(x, ˆ R(x)) = max






The decision maker believes that the partner acts kindly if his action gives the decision maker
more than his payoﬀ under anonymous decision making.
We similarly deﬁne the partner’s reciprocal utility function:
πP(x) − R + ψκP(x,R)κM(x, ˆ ˆ R(x)) (16)
7The choice of reference utility is a free parameter in all preference-based reciprocity models. For example,
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) calculate the reference utility as the average of the highest payoﬀ and the
lowest payoﬀ each of the two agents can secure for the other party (taking beliefs into account). Our particular
choice simpliﬁes our analysis considerably.
14As in our enforced reciprocity model, we assume the partner has no intrinsic altruism. The
partner’s intended kindness is κP(x,R) and he believes that the decision maker’s intended
kindness is κM(x, ˆ ˆ R(x)) where ˆ ˆ R(x) is the partner’s belief about the decision maker’s belief
ˆ R(x).
An equilibrium of the game is an action ˜ x∗
MP and a schedule R(x) which speciﬁes the
partner’s optimal repayment for each action of the decision maker.
Proposition 2 In the preference-based reciprocity model there is a unique equilibrium with a
repayment schedule which is increasing in x. When giving is ineﬃcient the decision maker
always chooses the same action ˜ x∗
MP = x∗
MP as under anonymous decision making. When
giving is eﬃcient and agents are suﬃciently reciprocal then the decision maker chooses an
action ˜ x∗
MP >x ∗
MP in equilibrium which is increasing in the probability of future interaction
p(DMP).
Proof: see appendix B
When giving is ineﬃcient, any giving beyond the anonymous level destroys social surplus, and
hence at least one of the two must be receiving a utility lower than the anonymous-giving case.
Hence mutual positive kindness is not possible. Lowering x would allow the decision maker to
replicate any repayment schedule R(x), which would leave the partner’s payoﬀ unchanged and
increase the decision maker’s utility, it would still give her lower utility than the anonymous
allocation. However, when giving is eﬃcient the decision maker can “trade” an increase in x
for a repayment R(x) which allows both agents to be kind to each other.
2.4.2 Testable Implications of Preference-Based Reciprocity
Table 1 summarizes the empirical predictions of the preference-based reciprocity model. Like
the enforced reciprocity model it predicts excess generosity towards friends under non-anonymity
only when giving is eﬃcient. However, when we control for the frequency of future interaction
(through social distance for example) we do not expect network ﬂow to have an independent
eﬀect on excess generosity.
3 Experimental Design
We used two web-based experiments to measure decision making in social networks: a series of
modiﬁed dictator games with diﬀerent exchange rates and a helping game.I na l le x p e r i m e n t s
the decision maker repeatedly chooses an action which determines her and the partner’s payoﬀs.
15The partner is either a nameless partner (randomly chosen from the population), or a speciﬁc
named player. Both experiments have two treatments where the decision maker makes his
decision either anonymously or non-anonymously. One decision for each decision maker is
chosen randomly at the end of the experiment. If the decision is anonymous the players are
not told which decision was chosen for payment - otherwise they are told. The main diﬀerence
between the dictator game experiments and the helping game experiment is the fact that the
anonymous and non-anonymous treatments are conducted within subjects in the case of the
dictator games and between subjects in the case of the helping game. Moreover, in the dictator
experiments we also asked partners about their beliefs about the expected generosity of various
named decision makers under anonymous and non-anonymous decision making. We elicited
beliefs using an incentive compatible mechanism.
3.1 Measuring Friendship in Web-Based Experiments
Sociologists typically measure social networks by asking subjects about their ﬁve or ten best
friends. Since all of our experiments were web-based we were concerned that lack of interaction
with a human surveyor would lead to more misreported friendships. We therefore developed
two simple games which provide incentives for subjects to report their friendships truthfully.
For the dictator game we used the coordination game technique. Each subject is told to
list her 10 best friends and the amount of time she spends with each of them on average per
week (0-30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1-2 hours, 2-4 hours, 4-8 hours or more than 8
hours). The subject is paid some small amount m (in our case, 50 cents) with 50 percent
probability for each listed friend who also lists them. The probability increases to 75 percent
if subjects also agree on the amount of time they spend together each week. We chose the
expected payoﬀ (25 or 37.50 cents) both large enough to give subjects an incentive to report
their friends truthfully and small enough to avoid ‘gaming’. The randomization was included
to avoid disappointment if a subject is named by few friends.
For the helping game we developed the trivia game technique. Subjects are also asked to
list 10 friends. Over the course of several weeks a computer program randomly selects some
of these subject-friend links and sends an email to the friend asking him to select the correct
answer to a multiple choice question such as what time he gets up in the morning. Once a
subject’s friend has answered the question the subject receives an email which directs her to
a web page with a 15 second time limit where she has to answer the same multiple choice
question about the friend. If the subject and her friend submit identical answers, they both
win a prize. The trivia game provides incentives to list friends with whom one spends a lot of
time and whose habits one is therefore familiar with.
16The coordination game and the trivia game were run at the same university in two consec-
utive years (December 2003 and December 2004). This allowed us to compare both techniques
directly by focusing on 167 subjects who participated in both studies.8 The 2003 experiment
only allowed students to choose friends who lived in two neighboring dormitories which house
about 17 percent of the student population. On average a subject listed 3.37 friends in 2004
whom they could have listed as a friend in 2003. Among this pool of friends, 64 percent were
actually listed in 2003. 34 percent of all subjects listed all their 2004 friends in 2003 and 77
percent listed at least half of them. This implies that over the course of the year subjects made
about one new friend in their dormitory, which we consider plausible.
We deﬁned the social network as follows: two subjects were said to have a direct link if
one of them named the other person. We call this type of social network the “OR-network”.9
3.2 Dictator Game
After measuring the social network we randomly assign each subject the role of decision maker
or partner.10 Each decision maker makes several decisions over a period of several days. For
each decision maker only one of her decisions is randomly selected at the end of the experiment
and she and her respective partner are paid accordingly and informed by email about their
earnings.
At ﬁrst, each decision maker is invited by email to play modiﬁed dictator games with a
nameless partner who is a randomly selected student in her dormitory. She is asked to make
allocation decisions in two situations: in the anonymous situation neither decision maker nor
partner ﬁnd out each other’s identity and in the non-anonymous situation both players are
informed about each other’s identity by email at the end of the experiment. In each situation
the decision maker divides 50 tokens between herself and the partner. In the ﬁrst decision each
token is worth 30 cents to the partner and 10 cents to herself (e.g. giving is eﬃcient). In the
second decision each token is worth 20 cents to both players (e.g. giving is neutral). In the
third decision each token is worth 30 cents to the decision maker and 10 cents to the partner
(e.g. giving is ineﬃcient); as a result the maximum earnings of a subject are $15.
A few days after the ﬁrst round of decisions, all decision makers are invited by email
to participate in a second round. In this round they are matched with ﬁve diﬀerent named
8569 subjects participated in the coordination game. 1/3 of them were seniors who left university and the
participation for the trivia game experiment was about 50 percent.
9We get very similar results when we use the “AND-network” where a link exists only if both subjects name
each other. The OR-network deﬁnition has desirable monotonicity properties: a subject with above average
number of friends will have above average number of friends in the measured network even when the network
survey truncates his true network. This is not always true for the AND-network.
10In the experimental instructions we referred to decision maker and partner simply as player 1 and player 2.
17partners: a direct friend, an indirect friend, a friend of an indirect friend, a student in the
same staircase/ﬂoor who is at least distance 4 removed from the student, and a randomly
selected student from the same house who falls into none of the above categories. The decision
maker is again asked to make allocation decisions in both the anonymous and non-anonymous
situation. In both situations the decision maker makes the same three decisions as in the ﬁrst
round and allocates tokens at exchange rates of 1:3, 1:1 and 3:1.
Note that each decision maker makes 6 decisions for each partner (3 exchange rates and
anonymous/non-anonymous treatment) and all together takes 36 decisions which makes it
very diﬃcult to identify a match ex-post from one’s earnings. A decision maker would need to
‘code’ each anonymous decision by making some unique allocation decision (such as passing
26 instead of 25 tokens) and then recall these decisions when payments were made. We believe
that few subjects in our experiment tried to go to such lengths since we also informed them in
advance that payments would take two to three weeks to process.
We measure partners’ beliefs in the anonymous treatment by inviting all subjects who play
the role of partner once by email. The partner is matched with ﬁve diﬀerent decision makers in
the same way as we matched decision makers to partners (see above). The partner knows that
each of the decision makers makes three anonymous allocation decisions in modiﬁed dictators
games with exchanges rates 1:3, 1:1 and 3:1. He knows that at most one of the decisions will be
implemented. The partner is asked to predict each decision maker’s action for each exchange
rate. Each mispredicted token (if the decision is implemented) reduces the partner’s earnings
by 10 cents. Therefore, the partner has incentives to report his median belief.
3.3 Helping Game
In the helping game each decision maker is endowed with $45 and each partner is endowed
with $0. The experimenter secretly chooses a random price between $0 and $30. The decision
maker is asked to report the maximum price she would be willing to pay so that the partner
receives a gain of $30. If her maximum willingness to pay is below the price chosen by the
experimenter the partner gets $0 and the decision maker gets her endowment.
Eﬀectively, the decision maker in the helping game reveals how much she values $30 to the
partner. As in our dictator design subjects are invited twice to make two rounds of decisions:
in the ﬁrst round they play with a nameless partner while in the second round they face
four named partners. However, we chose a between-subjects design: the decisions for the
nameless partner in the ﬁrst round are always anonymous while in the second round decisions
are either all anonymous or all non-anonymous. Every subject played the game in both roles,
as a decision-maker and a partner. Of course only one decision in one role was selected for
18payment.
4D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
All experiments were conducted with undergraduates at Harvard University who had at least
started their sophomore year.
4.1 Dictator Games
In December 2003 Harvard undergraduates at two (out of 12) upperclass houses were recruited
through posters, ﬂyers and mail invitation and directed to a website. A prospective subject
was asked to provide her email address and was sent a password. Subjects without a valid
email address were excluded. All future earnings from the experiment were transferred to the
electronic cash-card account of the student. These prepaid cards are widely used on campus
as cash substitute and many oﬀ-campus merchants accept the cards as well.
Subjects who logged onto the website were asked to (1) report their best friends using the
coordination game technique described in the previous section and (2) ﬁll in a questionnaire
asking basic demographic information. Subjects were restricted to naming friends from the
two houses where our experiment was conducted. Subjects were paid their earnings from the
coordination game plus a ﬂat payment of $10 for completing the survey. Moreover, they were
eligible to earn cash prizes in a raﬄe which added on average another $3 to their earnings.
Out of 806 students in those two houses 569 (or 71 percent) participated in the social
network survey. The survey netted 5690 one-way links. Of those, 2086 links were symmetric
links where both agents named each other.11 The resulting OR-network consists of a single
connected component with 802 subjects. 51 percent of subjects in the baseline survey were
women. 31 percent of subjects were sophomores, 30 percent were juniors and 39 percent were
seniors.
The dictator game experiment was conducted in May 2004 over a period of one week. Half
of all subjects who participated in the baseline were randomly selected to be allocators. 193
out of 284 eligible subjects participated in round 1 and 181 subjects participated in round
2. The participants were representative of the composition of the baseline sample: 58 percent
were women, 28 percent were sophomores, 28 percent were juniors and 44 percent were seniors.
11For symmetric links, the two parties’ assessment of the time spent together in a typical week diﬀered by
not more than one category out of ﬁve in 80 percent of all cases (subjects could list 0-30min, 30min-1h, 1h to
2h, 2h to 4h and more than 4 hours).
194.2 Helping Game
Information on social networks was collected through an online Trivia Game at the popu-
lar student website facebook.com where students post their online proﬁles with biographic
information as well as a list of their on-campus friends. More than 90 percent of Harvard
undergraduates are members of facebook.com. As Ward (2004) notes, however, users often
compile lists of over 100 friends, containing many people with whom they maintain only weak
social ties. The trivia game technique provides a particularly convenient method to identify
the subset of strong friendships among facebook friends. In December 2004 an invitation to
the trivia game appeared for a four-week period on the home page of facebook.com after a
member logged in. 2,360 students completed the trivia game signup process. Upperclassmen
had higher participation rates than freshmen, with only 34 percent of freshman responding,
but 45 percent, 52 percent, and 53 percent of sophomores, juniors, and seniors participating,
respectively.
There were 12,782 links between participants out of a 23,600 total links and 6,880 of these
links were symmetric. In total, 5,576 out of the 6,389 undergraduates at Harvard College had
either participated or been named by a participant. The social OR-network of 5,576 individuals
contains a single component (i.e. all individuals are connected) having a mean path length of
4.2 between participants.
The helping game experiment was conducted in May 2006 over a period of one week with
all Juniors and Seniors who had participated in the trivia game of the previous year. 776
subjects participated in the ﬁrst part of the helping game, and 695 subjects completed the
second part. 58 percent of participants were women. 46 percent were juniors and 54 percent
were seniors.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 3 and Table 3 shows the mean actions of decision makers for dictator games and
helping game, in both the anonymous and non-anonymous decisions. Two major regularities
are immediately apparent: in all games and in both treatments decision makers’ generosity
towards the partner is decreasing in social distance, and the decision makers’ generosity is
always higher in the non-anonymous treatment than in the anonymous treatment for any
game and at any social distance. Between treatment diﬀerences are signiﬁcant across all social
distances in the dictator game, and for social distance 1 and 2 in the helping game. Decision
makers’ actions are signiﬁcantly larger for direct friends than all other distances for both games
and both treatments.
20In the dictator game with an exchange rate of 1:3 the decision maker passes about 19.19
tokens to a friend versus 12.20 tokens to a principal at social distance 4. With an exchange
rate of 3:1 the decision maker passes only 8.03 versus 6.15 tokens, respectively. In the non-
anonymous treatment the decision maker passes about 5 tokens more when altruism is eﬃcient
for all social distances and about 2 to 4 tokens more when altruism is ineﬃcient. In the helping
game the average cutoﬀ of 12.77 for a friend decreases to 7.09 for a partner at social distance
4 in the anonymous treatment. Non-anonymity increases the cutoﬀ by about $2.
Curiously, nameless partners are treated more generously than indirect friends in the anony-
mous treatment of all the dictator games and the helping game despite the fact that the ex-
pected social distance of a randomly chosen partner is at least three. In the non-anonymous
treatment, on the other hand, the contributions to nameless partners closely track contribu-
tions to named partners at distance three.
We can interpret nameless decisions in the anonymous treatment as decision makers’ intrin-
sic and unconditional generosity since the decision maker has no information about the partner.
Our data replicates the well-known ﬁndings of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv,
and Markovits (2005) that individuals are highly heterogenous in their unconditional altruism.
In particular, many subjects are perfectly selﬁsh: in the three dictator games we observe 28,
46 and 64 percent of subjects pass zero, while in the helping game 20 percent set a cutoﬀ of
zero.
For the dictator games, we also collected the partners’ beliefs about decision makers’ actions
which we report in table 4 and ﬁgure 3. Partners’ beliefs are reasonably accurate and anticipate
the eﬀect of social distance. Beliefs are most accurate when altruism is eﬃcient. When altruism
is ineﬃcient partners expect decision makers to be somewhat more generous than they actually
are.
5 Directed Altruism
In this section we use data from the anonymous treatments to analyze how decision makers’
altruistic preferences vary with social distance. For the dictator game experiment we can
also examine to what extent partners can predict decision makers’ preferences. Finally, we
present evidence that subjects who behave more altruistically in general as measured by their
treatment of nameless partners also tend to have more altruistic friends.
21Table 2: Relative magnitudes of directed altruism and non-anonymity eﬀects as percentages
of all decision makers’ average nameless action and as percentages of standard deviation of
nameless actions
Directed Altruism Eﬀect of Non-Anonymity
Relative to: SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 Network Flow
Dictator Game (1:3)
Average 52 8 -8 24 18 3 19
Standard dev. 50 7 -7 23 18 3 18
Dictator Game (1:1)
Average 52 16 3 21 12 9 10
Standard dev. 47 14 3 19 11 8 9
Dictator Game (3:1)
Average 95 49 43 -7 8 -3 -6
Standard dev. 60 31 27 -4 5 -2 -4
Helping Game
Average 88 36 12 35 13 19 30
Standard dev. 115 48 16 46 17 25 39
An “Average”-row is calculated by dividing estimates for directed altruism and the eﬀect of non-anonymity by
the average nameless decision in the anonymous treatment (see table 3). A “Standard dev.”-row is calculated
by dividing the same estimates by the standard deviation of the nameless decision in the anonymous treatment.
The directed altruism and non-anonymity estimates are taken from tables 5 and 12. For the network ﬂow
column we report the estimated eﬀect of a one-standard deviation increase in network ﬂow (equal to 10 units
of network ﬂow for “circle of trust” K =2 ) .
5.1 Decision Makers’ Actions
In section 2.1 we derived the following speciﬁcation for estimating the strength of directed
altruism:
x∗
MP = αZ + γ1DMP + γM +  MP (3)
Recall that x∗
MP is the decision maker’s action in the anonymous treatment of one of the
three dictator games and the helping games respectively. Since agents’ actions are bounded
below and above by 0 and 50 in the case of the dictator games and 0 and 30 in the case of
the helping game we use Tobit regressions to estimate equation 3. We exploit the fact that
we observe multiple actions for each decision maker in the anonymous treatment and control
for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision maker’s baseline altruistic type γM by including
22random eﬀects.12 We control for social distance DMP between decision maker and partner
by including dummy variables SD1t oSD5. The omitted categories are SD4 for the dictator
games and SD5 for the helping game. The estimated coeﬃcient on SD1 in a dictator game,
for example, should therefore be interpreted as the number of extra tokens that the decision
maker passes to a direct friend compared to a distant partner in the anonymous treatment
while the estimated coeﬃcient on SD2 captures directed altruism towards an indirect friend.
The estimates of the Tobit regression for all dictator games and the helping games are reported
in the odd-numbered columns of table 5.
We also estimate the same speciﬁcation with additional covariates and report the results
in the even-numbered columns of table 5. We include the decision maker’s action towards
a nameless player in the anonymous treatment as a proxy for the decision maker’s baseline
altruistic type γM. In the helping game we can also control for the partner’s nameless de-
cision because all subjects in the helping game played both the role of the decision maker
and the partner. Furthermore we add dummy variables for both player’s gender, their class
(sophomores, juniors or seniors) and whether they share a staircase (dictator game) or a house
(helping game).13
Result 1 Baseline altruism and directed altruism are correlated. Subjects who give more to
nameless partners also give more to speciﬁc named partners.
The two variables that consistently and strongly predict how generously a decision maker
treats a partner in her social network are social distance and generosity towards a nameless
partner. For both dictator and helping games each one unit increase in generosity towards a
nameless partner is associated with a 0.56 to 1.40 unit increase in generosity towards a named
player. Since the elicitation of the nameless decision and the named decisions was one week
apart this indicates remarkable stability in decision makers’ preferences over time. Because
the pass-through from “nameless altruism” towards “named altruism” is fairly close to 1 we
view the nameless decision of a decision maker as a useful measure for her intrinsic baseline
altruism which strongly inﬂuences the decision maker’s action towards named players.
Result 2 Social closeness induces directed altruism. Allocations to friends are substantially
higher than allocations to strangers/distant partners.
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: decision makers are substantially more generous
to direct friends than to partners at greater social distance. Generosity decreases quickly and
12Our results are very similar when we instead estimate equation 3 using standard random eﬀects or ﬁxed
eﬀects GLS.
13Since the participation rate was lower for the helping game a dummy variable for sharing the same entryway
is less useful.
23monotonically with social distance even though the estimated coeﬃcients on SD2 and SD3
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for all games. The distance coeﬃcients are of similar magnitude
between the three exchange rates in the dictator game which implies that decision makers are
making a greater relative sacriﬁce in the case of ineﬃcient altruism.
In order to assess the magnitude of directed altruism we compare in table 2 the estimated
coeﬃcients on social distance dummies SD1 to SD3 with average generosity towards nameless
partners in the anonymous treatment. Directed altruism towards friends equals 52 percent
of average nameless generosity for the eﬃcient dictator game and increases to 88 percent
in the helping game. When altruism is ineﬃcient the directed altruism eﬀects even exceeds
average nameless generosity. Social distance is therefore as important a predictor of a subjects’
generosity as her underlying intrinsic baseline altruism.
Another way of evaluating the magnitude of directed altruism is to ask the question how
much less selﬁsh a decision maker becomes relative to the fat-tailed distribution of baseline
altruism in the population when she makes decisions for socially close partners (Andreoni
and Miller 2002, Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits 2005). In table 2 we therefore also report the
estimated coeﬃcients on SD1 to SD3 as percentage of the standard deviation of the distribution
of nameless decisions. We ﬁnd that social proximity to the partner moves the decision maker’s
generosity by at least 0.47 of a standard deviation in the dictator games to 1.15 of a standard
deviation in the helping game.
Interestingly, gender and geographic proximity have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on generosity.
However, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients on gender of the decision maker are consistent
with the work of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) who found that men are more likely to
exhibit social value maximizing preferences: they are more generous in dictator games when
giving is eﬃcient and less generous when giving is ineﬃcient. Juniors are somewhat more
selﬁsh than both sophomores and seniors - however, most of the coeﬃcients on class dummies
are insigniﬁcant.
5.2 Partners’ Beliefs
We now analyze to what extent partners are aware of either the baseline altruism of the
decision maker or of her directed altruism. We simply take the same empirical speciﬁcation 3
for directed altruism from the previous section but estimate it using partners’ beliefs instead
of decision maker’s action on the left-hand side. We also specify random eﬀects on the partner
level rather than the decision-maker level because our experiment provides us with multiple
observations for each partner. The odd and even numbered columns in table 6 report our
estimates without and with additional covariates. Compared to table 5 we do not list estimates
24for the helping game because we only asked partners’ beliefs for the dictator game experiment.
Result 3 Beliefs reﬂect directed altruism. Subjects accurately predict that on average friends
will be more generous. However, they overestimate the generosity of indirect friends, and do
not predict individual diﬀerences in baseline altruism between friends.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that partners are well aware of the directed altruism of decision makers.
The number of extra tokens that partners expect from their direct friends (SD1) is close to
decision makers’ action. Partners believe that decision makers are slightly more altruistic than
they actually are when giving is eﬃcient (exchange rate 1:3) and that they are slightly less
altruistic than they actually are when giving is ineﬃcient (exchange rate 3:1). Interestingly,
partners expect indirect friends (SD2) to be signiﬁcantly more generous than these decision
makers actually behave when giving is eﬃcient or neutral. Decision makers do not treat
indirect friends signiﬁcantly more generously than strangers but our corresponding estimates
for partners’ expectations are both almost double as large and strongly signiﬁcant.
Again, none of the other demographic and geographic covariates matter except for the
decision maker’s gender: partners expect male decision makers to be signiﬁcantly less generous
when giving is neutral and especially when it is ineﬃcient. This is again consistent with
Andreoni and Vesterlund’s (2001) ﬁndings.
Surprisingly, partners’ beliefs are completely unaﬀected by the intrinsic baseline altruism
of the decision maker. In contrast, we found in the previous section that each extra token a
decision maker passes to a nameless partner increases her contribution to a named partner by
a comparable amount. One explanation could be that partners are good at estimating social
distance and have learned that decision makers treat friends more generously but they are
unable to observe intrinsic preferences. We would then expect that non-anonymity decreases
with social distance: partners should be better at observing the preferences of direct friends
compared to socially distant agents. Therefore, we re-estimate our empirical model 3 and
include an interaction term between the decision maker’s nameless decision and social distance
SD1. The results are reported in the odd-numbered columns of table 7 (without demographic
and geographic covariates). We do not ﬁnd any evidence that partners are any better in
observing the preferences of a socially close versus a distant decision maker: in fact two out of
the three estimates of the interaction term are negative.
For 204 out of the 563 matches between a speciﬁc partner and a decision maker we also
have the actual choice of the decision maker for this partner. For this subset we estimate our
empirical model again but now use the decision maker’s actual choice rather than her nameless
25decision as a proxy for her baseline altruism. The estimates are reported in the even-numbered
columns of table 7. Again, neither actual choice nor the interaction between actual choice and
social distance aﬀect a partner’s expectations.
5.3 Correlation in Altruistic Preferences
We next examine whether more altruistic subjects also have more altruistic friends. We sep-
arate subjects into (approximate) quintiles based on their dictator game and helping game
choices for nameless partners. Tables 8 and 9 present the resulting distribution of friends’
generosity for each quintile.
Result 4 Friends sort by type. Subjects with a high level of baseline altruism tend to have
more friends with a high level of baseline altruism, while selﬁsh subjects tend to have more
selﬁsh friends.
First, we ﬁnd that altruists and selﬁsh subjects have the same number of friends. However, a
subject’s baseline altruism is correlated with the baseline altruism of her friends (Chi-Square
test: DG p<0.001, HG p<0.01). Selﬁsh subjects have more selﬁsh friends, and fewer
altruistic friends, while altruists have fewer selﬁsh friends and more altruistic friends. In
particular, in the helping game the most altruistic quintile has 25 percent more highly-altruistic
friends than any other group; in the dictator game the two most altruistic groups had more
than 20 percent more highly-altruistic friends than any other group. Moreover, the mean
nameless choice of a subject’s friends increases with the subject’s baseline altruism. The most
altruistic subjects have friends that are 25 percent more altruistic than the most selﬁsh subjects
in the dictator game, and 14 percent more altruistic in the helping game. The 3rd, 4th and
5th quintiles are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the 1st in the helping game, and the 4th and 5th
are diﬀerent from the ﬁrst in the dictator game (from t-tests). A non-parametric equality-of-
medians test rejects that the ﬁve quintiles are drawn from distributions with the same median
(DG p =0 .039, HG p<0.026). Hence, it seems that subjects tend to seek out and/or maintain
friendships with others who have similar social preferences.
We conﬁrm this ﬁnding in table 10 where we take all pairs of participating friends (including
those not matched in our experiment) and regress each subject’s baseline altruism on the
average baseline altruism of all their friends. As expected, the baseline altruism of a subjects’
friends is positively and signiﬁcantly related to her own baseline altruism in the helping game.
Increasing the generosity of a subject’s friends by 10 percent would increase the subjects
generosity by 2 percent. In the dictator game we have much fewer observations (since we only
observed nameless decisions for half the subjects), however the relationship is directionally
26positive, as we expect. Moreover, the correlation of types is not driven by clustering by
gender.
Additionally, it pays to be generous. Table 11 regresses the average allocation to partners
in the helping game from decisions made by direct friends in the anonymous treatment on
their own baseline altruism: partners with higher baseline altruism have substantially higher
earnings. Interestingly, this eﬀect is entirely due to the fact that nicer partners have nicer
friends but not due to nicer partners being treated more nicely by their friends: we already
showed in our directed altruism regressions in table 5 that decision makers do no treat generous
partners better. Indeed, when we also control for the average baseline altruism of decision
makers in table 11 then the partner’s baseline altruism no longer predicts her earnings from
friends’ decisions.
6 Non-anonymity vs. Anonymity
We now examine how a decision maker adjusts her action for a named partner when she
interacts with him non-anonymously. We start with a simple graphical analysis which allows
us to “eyeball” the main results which we then conﬁrm by testing the empirical speciﬁcation
from section 2.2. We also discuss which of our three theories - the enforced reciprocity, signaling
and preference-based reciprocity models - best ﬁt our ﬁndings.
6.1 Graphical Analysis
We plot the extra tokens that a decision maker passes to a speciﬁc partner in the non-
anonymous treatment relative to the anonymous treatment. Since our helping game was a
between-group design we can only perform this exercise for dictator decisions. We divide de-
cision makers into ﬁve bins depending on how generously they treated their partner in the
anonymous treatment. The most selﬁsh decision makers are those who passed between 0 and 9
tokens in the anonymous treatment. The other bins range from 10 to 19, 20 to 29, 30 to 39 and
from 40 to 50. We then plot the average number of extra tokens passed in the non-anonymous
treatment vs. the anonymous treatment, ˜ x∗
MP − x∗
MP, by bin and by relationship value VMP.
For ﬁgure 4 we use social distance as a proxy for the relationship value and for ﬁgure 5 we use
maximum network ﬂow with circle of trust K =2 . 14 Since network ﬂow takes values ranging
from 0 to 21 in our data set we need to group observations for a meaningful plot - we deﬁne
“strong relationships” as those with network ﬂow greater than the median value 3 and “weak
relationships” as those with network ﬂow less or equal to the median value 3.
14Our results are qualitatively very similar for other values of K.
27Both ﬁgures show that decision makers substantially increase their action under non-
anonymity compared to anonymity unless they already behaved very generously in the anony-
mous treatment.15 This non-anonymity eﬀect is strongest for selﬁsh decision makers and when
giving is eﬃcient: decision makers pass up to 10 extra tokens to the same partner in the
non-anonymous treatment. The eﬀect is less than half as large when giving is ineﬃcient and
decision makers pass at most 4 extra tokens under non-anonymity.
The main insight we take from both graphs is that the non-anonymity eﬀect declines with
relationship strength when giving is eﬃcient and somewhat declines when giving is neutral.
However, when giving is ineﬃcient the decision makers’ contributions do not decrease with
social distance for four out of the ﬁve bins. This provides some preliminary evidence in
support of the enforced and preference-based reciprocity mechanisms but does not support the
signaling mechanism.
The two graphs also suggest that directed altruism and the non-anonymity eﬀect are substi-
tutes: when we control for the strength of a relationship by either ﬁxing social distance in ﬁgure
4 or network ﬂow in ﬁgure 5 we ﬁnd that the non-anonymity eﬀect decreases monotonically in
most cases as decision makers become more generous in the anonymous treatment.
6.2 Tobit Regressions
In section 2.2.3 we derived the following empirical speciﬁcation for estimating the non-anonymity
channel:
˜ x∗
MP = ηZ + θx∗
MP + φVMP + υM +  MP (7)
Recall that ˜ x∗
MP is the decision maker’s action in the non-anonymous treatment when matched
with a speciﬁc named partner P in one of the three dictator games and the helping games
respectively. We use again Tobit regressions to take account of the censoring of the left-hand
side variable and exploit the panel structure of our data to control for unobserved heterogeneity
in the decision maker’s response to the non-anonymous treatment. We proxy for the strength
of the decision maker’s relationship with the partner, VMP, by including either social distance
dummies or maximum network ﬂow (K =2 ) . 16 The omitted categories are SD4f o rt h e
dictator games and SD5 for the helping game. The estimated coeﬃcient on SD1 in a dictator
game, for example, should therefore be interpreted as the number of extra tokens that the
decision maker passes to a direct friend under non-anonymity compared to the number of
extra tokens that she passes to a stranger under non-anonymity. All of our regressions control
15Even in this case the majority of decision makers do not decrease their action - the negative averages result
from a few decision makers decreasing their contributions substantially in the non-anonymous treatment.
16In one speciﬁcation we include both types measures in the same regression.
28for the class of the decision maker and partner because we expect the non-anonymity eﬀect
to be smaller for juniors and especially seniors since they are less likely than sophomores to
interact with the decision maker in the future. We also include the decision maker’s action
towards a nameless partner in the non-anonymous treatment on the right-hand side which
we use as a proxy for the decision maker’s response υM to non-anonymous interaction with a
partner.
Importantly, we control for the decision maker’s intrinsic altruism towards the same partner
P by including her decision in the non-anonymous treatment, x∗
MP on the right-hand side of
all of our regressions. This poses a problem for the helping game because of its between-group
design - for each decision maker/partner match in the non-anonymous treatment we do not
observe the action the decision maker would have chosen for that partner in the anonymous
treatment. We therefore estimate it by running an auxiliary random-eﬀects Tobit regression
with data from the non-anonymous treatment and where we include social distance dummies
and the same set of covariates Z (nameless decision, class dummies) as in our empirical speci-
ﬁcation of the non-anonymity channel.
For each of the three dictator games and the helping game we estimate three variants of
our empirical model. We ﬁrst use only social distance to proxy for the strength of a decision
maker’s relationship to the partner, then use only maximum network ﬂow and ﬁnally use both
measures in the same regression. All results are reported in table 12.
Result 5 The observability of decisions by recipients increases giving more for friends than
for strangers. The eﬀect is only induced when giving increases social surplus and it is therefore
eﬃciency-enhancing.
Our main ﬁnding is that, controlling for a decision maker’s action in the anonymous treatment,
her response to non-anonymity is decreasing with the strength of her relationship to the partner
but only if giving is not ineﬃcient. This is true regardless of whether we proxy for the strength
of a relationship using social distance or maximum network ﬂow. The magnitude of this eﬀect
is large and most pronounced in the dictator game with exchange rate 1:3 - a decision maker
increases her action by 4.18 tokens when she makes a decision for a friend compared to a
socially distant partner and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Moreover, the eﬀect is smaller but still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the ﬁve percent level
for friends of friends (SD2).17
In order to compare the magnitude of this non-anonymity eﬀect with directed altruism we
compare in table 2 the estimated coeﬃcients on social distance dummies SD1 to SD3 as well
17In contrast, when we tested for directed altruism in the previous section we did not ﬁnd such a strong eﬀect
for second-order friends.
29as a one-standard deviation increase in network ﬂow with average generosity towards nameless
partners in the anonymous treatment. Friends receive an extra transfer of surplus which equals
about 24 percent of average nameless generosity for the eﬃcient dictator game and about 35
percent for the helping game. Indirect friends receive an extra transfer of about 18 percent of
surplus in the eﬃcient dictator game. We ﬁnd a similar pattern but slightly smaller magnitudes
for the neutral dictator game. All together, the eﬀect of non-anonymity is about half as large
as the directed altruism eﬀect.18 Moreover, the non-anonymity eﬀect is generally weaker for
decision makers who are juniors and seniors compared to sophomores: the sign on the junior
and senior dummies are consistently negative even though they are not always statistically
signiﬁcant. This is consistent with our model of enforced reciprocity, since the length of the
future relationship (and thus its value) is shorter (lower) for upperclassmen.
6.3 Probit Regressions
An alternative way to compare the non-anonymous with the anonymous treatment in our
dictator games is to examine when the decision maker passes strictly more tokens under non-
anonymity. In about 50 percent of all matches between a decision maker and some named
partner the decision maker passes the same number of tokens in both treatments. This phe-
nomenon is consistent with all three of our theoretical mechanisms as long as the decision
maker attaches zero value to the relationship with the partner.
We therefore estimate our empirical model 7 with a dummy variable on the left-hand side
which equals 1 only if the decision maker passes strictly more tokens under non-anonymity.
We use random-eﬀects Probit estimation and report the results in table 13 with all estimates
interpretable as marginal eﬀects. The Probit approach is consistent with our Tobit estimates.
When giving is eﬃcient decision makers are about 91 percent more likely to increase their
token allocation when interacting non-anonymously with direct friends compared to doing the
same when they interact with socially distant partners. Similarly, each unit increase in network
ﬂow raises the probability of passing more tokens by 6.3 percent. Both the social distance and
network ﬂow eﬀects disappear when giving is neutral or ineﬃcient.
Interestingly, when we use an analogous Probit regression to test when the decision maker
passes strictly fewer tokens under non-anonymity there is some evidence that the eﬀect of
social distance is reversed (see table 14): decision makers are less likely to pass strictly fewer
tokens to direct friends compared to stranger when giving is eﬃcient but are more likely to do
so when altruism is ineﬃcient. However, the estimates are only marginally signiﬁcant and the
18The relative comparison of the non-anonymity and directed altruism eﬀects does not change if we instead
normalize all estimates by using the standard deviation of the distribution of nameless decisions.
30evidence is therefore not conclusive.
6.4 Discussion
We can now review the testable implications which we derived for the enforced reciprocity,
signaling and preference-based reciprocity mechanisms in section 2 and summarized in table 1.
First of all, we found that when we control for the decision maker’s intrinsic altruism towards
the partner friends are only treated more generously than strangers under non-anonymity if
giving is eﬃcient and to some extent if giving is neutral but not if giving is ineﬃcient. This is
consistent with both the enforced reciprocity and the preference-based reciprocity mechanisms
but not with the signaling mechanism.
Result 6 The non-anonymity eﬀect increases with Network Flow.
In the Tobit table 12 we estimate one speciﬁcation for each of our four games where we include
both social distance dummies and maximum network ﬂow on the right-hand side. For both the
eﬃcient dictator game with exchange rate 1:3 and the helping game we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
on social distance dummies decrease and become insigniﬁcant when we add network ﬂow while
the coeﬃcient on ﬂow remains signiﬁcant for the helping game. We ﬁnd a similar pattern in
our Probit table 13.
It is possible that network ﬂow does not proxy for the network’s ability to enforce repayment
of favors but rather provides a measure for the amount of time that the decision maker spends
with the partner. For the dictator games, we collected information on the amount of time
subjects spend with their direct friends on average each week. We ﬁnd that this measure is
essentially uncorrelated with our network ﬂow measure for direct friends (correlation coeﬃcient
is 0.03). In table 15 we re-estimate our empirical model for the non-anonymity channel and
include both network ﬂow and time spent together per week. We ﬁnd that when giving is
eﬃcient greater network ﬂow increases the decision maker’s generosity towards a direct friend
under non-anonymity even when we control for time spent together. Moreover, the estimated
coeﬃcient on time spent together is consistently insigniﬁcant and negative. We interpret these
ﬁndings as evidence for the enforced reciprocity hypothesis.
Result 7 The non-anonymity eﬀect and directed altruism are substitutes.
We also ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcients on the decision maker’s anonymous action, x∗
MP,
are always less than 1 which imply that directed altruism and the strength of the decision
maker’s response to anonymity are indeed substitutes. This is also consistent with the enforced
reciprocity mechanism.
317C o n c l u s i o n
Our motivation for this paper was to determine the value of having a friend rather than a
stranger make payoﬀ-relevant decisions. We identiﬁed two main eﬀects. First of all, directed
altruism makes a decision maker on average at least half a standard deviation more generous
relative to the distribution of decision makers’ intrinsic baseline altruism. If giving increases
social surplus and the partner can observe the decision maker’s action, generosity increases by
another quarter of a standard deviation on average. The latter eﬀect can be well explained
by a model of enforced reciprocity which builds on Mobius and Szeidl (2006) to provide a
tractable repeated game model in social networks.
We view our ﬁndings as a ﬁrst step towards a theory of trust in social networks. The bulk
of the experimental and theoretical literature on trust has evolved around one-shot games
played between strangers. In particular, the seminal work of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995) introduced the investment or trust game. This literature basically asks the question
why strangers trust each other (absolute trust). We ask a complementary question: why should
we trust some decision makers more than others (diﬀerential trust)? Social networks can be
measured and therefore provide us with ample data to test and calibrate models of diﬀerential
trust.
A natural next step in this research agenda is to ask whether partners in fact choose
“trustworthy” decision makers. Karlan, Mobius, and Rosenblat (2006) examine this question
in a naturalistic ﬁeld experiment with micro-loans in Peruvian shantytowns. In their design
partners (“borrowers”) can ask diﬀerent decision makers (“lenders”) to provide them with a
loan. The price (“interest rate”) for choosing diﬀerent lenders is exogenously randomized by
the experimenter. The lending data can then be analyzed for preference reversals: how much
would a partner be willing to pay to replace a socially distant for a socially close decision
maker. These estimates can then be compared to the value of friendship which we derived in
this paper.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We assume that giving is eﬃcient. We deﬁne x as follows:
πP(x) − F = πP(x∗) (17)
The partner gets the same payoﬀ from action x and paying F as he gets from the anonymous
action x∗. Because giving is eﬃcient the decision maker’s payoﬀ satisﬁes:
πM(x)+F>π M(x∗) (18)
Concavity and quasisupermodularity of the utility function yields the following inequalities:
u1(πM(x)+F,πP(x) − F) <u 1 (πM(x∗),π P(x∗))
u2(πM(x)+F,πP(x) − F) >u 2 (πM(x∗),π P(x∗)) (19)
Furthermore, we know that x∗ maximizes the decision maker’s utility under anonymity:
u1 (πM(x∗),π P(x∗)) = u2 (πM(x∗),π P(x∗)) (20)
By combining these inequalities it follows that the marginal utility of the decision maker’s own
consumption is lower than the marginal utility of the partner’s consumption when the decision
maker takes action x and declares F: hence, the decision maker will optimally increase her
action x. Hence it follows that ˜ x∗ >x ∗. Using an analogous argument we can show that
πM(x∗) − πM(˜ x∗)0.
This shows that the decision maker’s optimal action will give greater surplus to both players
and hence will increase both of their utilities under non-anonymity.
B Proof of Proposition 2
To keep things simple we assume p = 1 (our results easily extend to the general case). We
start by solving the partner’s problem of choosing the repayment R. The partner maximizes:
πP(x) − R + ψ [UM(x,R) − UM(x∗,0)]
+ κM(x, ˆ ˆ R(x)) (21)
34Diﬀerentiating with respect to R and using the fact that in equilibrium R = ˆ ˆ R(x)g i v e su st h e




κM(x,R) = 0 (22)
Lemma 2 The unique equilibrium repayment schedule R(x) satisﬁes R(x)=0for x ≤ x∗ and
is weakly increasing in x.
Proof: By deﬁnition we have κM(x∗,R(x∗)) = 0 such that the partner would always like to






πP(x) − R − πP(x∗)
(23)
The LHS of the equation is strictly decreasing in R and strictly increasing in x because
we assumed a quasi-supermodular utility function for the decision maker. The RHS is
strictly increasing in R and strictly decreasing in x. Therefore, there is a unique interior
solution for R and the solution is strictly increasing in x. ♠
The decision maker’s objective function is:
UM(x, ˆ R(x)) + ψκM(x, ˆ R(x))






Consider her optimal decision when giving is ineﬃcient. By choosing the same decision as
under anonymity she can guarantee herself a utility UM(x∗
MP,0). Any other choice of x will
either set κM =0o rκP = 0 - therefore her utility will be UM(x, ˆ R(x)) which is lower than
UM(x∗
MP,0).
Next consider the case where giving is eﬃcient and ﬁx some x>x ∗
MP. From the partner’s
ﬁrst-order condition we can see that R(x) → πP(x) − πP(x∗
MP)a sψ →∞ . Therefore, the
decision maker receives almost all extra proﬁts of the partner from increasing her action above
x∗
MP when both agents are suﬃciently reciprocal. The decision maker will hence be strictly
better oﬀ by choosing x instead of x∗
MP. This shows that the optimal action of the decision
maker is strictly greater than x∗
MP.
35Figure 2: Examples to illustrate diﬀerence between maximum network ﬂow and social distance
M P M P
M P M P
SD  =  1F l ow  =  1S D   =  2F l ow  =  1
SD  =  1F l ow  =  3 SD  =  3F l ow  =  3
Network ﬂow is calculated between decision maker M and partner P under the assumption that all bilateral
relationships have unit value.Table 3: Summary statistics for decision makers’ actions in dictator and helping games
Anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5 Nameless
Dictator Game (N=206) (N=286) (N=312) (N=97) (N=4) (N=193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42
( 19.64) ( 19.30) ( 18.79) ( 15.47) ( 25.00) ( 18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61
( 13.53) ( 12.68) ( 11.89) ( 10.25) ( 12.50) ( 12.83)
Ex. Rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31
( 13.55) ( 12.88) ( 11.10) ( 10.72) ( 0.00) ( 13.23)
Helping Game (N=876) (N=149) (N=73) (N=181) (N=78) (N=776)
12.77 8.97 7.14 7.68 7.09 9.52
( 8.14) ( 7.11) ( 6.80) ( 7.16) ( 6.95) ( 7.24)
Non-anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5 Nameless
Dictator Game (N=206) (N=288) (N=313) (N=99) (N=4) (N=193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 24.32 21.67 19.79 14.80 37.50 19.87
( 18.91) ( 18.75) ( 18.54) ( 15.72) ( 25.00) ( 18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 16.33 14.62 13.99 12.16 18.75 13.98
( 12.90) ( 12.34) ( 12.45) ( 10.68) ( 12.50) ( 12.82)
Ex. Rate 3:1 10.52 9.88 9.18 10.15 0.00 9.62
( 13.56) ( 13.17) ( 13.18) ( 12.77) ( 0.00) ( 13.80)
Helping Game (N=876) (N=149) (N=73) (N=181) (N=78)
12.77 8.97 7.14 7.68 7.09 9.52
( 8.14) ( 7.11) ( 6.80) ( 7.16) ( 6.95)
Table shows averages of number of passed tokens (dictator games) and average cutoﬀs (helping game) by social
distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Nameless refers to matches between decision
maker and partner where the identity of the partner is not known to the decision maker.
Table 4: Summary statistics for partners’ expectations in dictator games
Anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5
Dictator Game (N=262) (N=371) (N=401) (N=140) (N=2)
Ex. Rate 1:3 17.08 13.09 12.64 12.46 25.00
( 15.84) ( 14.22) ( 14.84) ( 12.83) ( 14.14)
Ex. Rate 1:1 16.14 13.84 11.15 12.85 22.50
( 12.06) ( 11.77) ( 11.30) ( 11.82) ( 3.54)
Ex. Rate 3:1 13.65 11.94 8.86 11.71 22.50
( 14.49) ( 13.86) ( 12.68) ( 14.34) ( 3.54)
Table shows averages of number of expected tokens by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are
in parenthesis.Figure 3: Average number of tokens passed by decision maker/expected by partner in dictator































1 2 3 4
Social Distance
Dictator 1:3 (anonymous) Dictator 1:3 (non−anonymous)
Dictator 1:1 (anonymous) Dictator 1:1 (non−anonymous)
Dictator 3:1 (anonymous) Dictator 3:1 (non−anonymous)
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Dictator 1:3 (anonymous) Dictator 1:1 (anonymous)
Dictator 3:1 (anonymous)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 7: Accuracy of partners’ beliefs
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass to Nameless (DM) 0.059 0.071 0.013
(0.042) (0.051) (0.071)
Pass to Nameless (DM) * SD1 -.071 -.001 0.119
(0.081) (0.093) (0.117)
Pass to Partner -.115 0.015 -.047
(0.084) (0.079) (0.126)
Pass to Partner * SD1 -.058 -.043 -.114
(0.131) (0.14) (0.205)
SD1 12.722 9.535 5.938 2.701 6.001 -3.993
(2.717)∗∗ (5.685)† (2.235)∗∗ (3.746) (2.867)∗ (4.856)
SD2 6.538 2.063 3.558 -1.896 3.972 -8.441
(2.229)∗∗ (4.555) (1.829)† (3.090) (2.520) (4.445)†
SD3 2.599 -3.194 -.827 -5.579 -.600 -9.966
(2.266) (4.851) (1.851) (3.187)† (2.554) (4.588)∗
Const. 3.192 11.769 7.784 12.288 2.835 10.293
(2.492) (4.723)∗ (1.943)∗∗ (2.911)∗∗ (2.726) (4.084)∗
Obs. 563 204 563 204 563 204
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens expected by the
partner in the anonymous treatment for each dictator game. “Pass to Nameless (DM)” denotes the number of
tokens the decision maker passed to nameless partners and “Pass to Partner” indicates the actual generosity
of the decision maker towards the partner. Omitted social distance is SD4. All speciﬁcations are estimated as
Tobit regressions with partner random eﬀects.
41Table 8: Correlation in baseline altruism among direct friends in the social network (dictator
game with 1:3 exchange rate)
Nameless Percent of Average # of Distribution of Friends’ Types (percent) Avg. Nameless DG
DG Choice Subjects Friends [0] [1,10] [11,15] [16,37] [38,50] Choice of Friends
[0] 35.23 16.75 38.65 11.04 16.56 13.19 20.55 17.02
[1,10] 15.54 16.97 24.16 24.16 19.46 13.42 18.79 17.76
[11,15] 13.99 17.44 37.50 20.14 9.72 10.42 22.22 17.19
[16,37] 13.99 17.19 31.39 14.60 10.95 10.22 32.85 21.21
[38,50] 21.24 17.83 28.39 11.86 13.56 19.07 27.12 21.39
Subjects are separated into approximate quintiles based on their dictator game (1:3) game choices for nameless
partners (anonymous).
Table 9: Correlation in baseline altruism among direct friends in the social network (helping
game)
Nameless Percent of Average # of Distribution of Friends’ Types (percent) Avg. Nameless HG
HG Choice Subjects Friends [0] [1,5] [6,12] [13,15] [16,30] Choice of Friends
[0] 19.61 12.16 20.49 21.79 22.11 26.02 9.59 9.07
[1,5] 20.39 12.36 19.88 20.77 16.02 32.34 10.98 9.66
[6,12] 19.35 12.72 20.24 16.07 20.54 30.95 12.20 9.87
[13,15] 30.13 12.27 15.84 21.58 20.59 31.49 10.50 9.83
[16,30] 10.52 12.36 15.57 19.53 21.64 27.97 15.30 10.34
Subjects are separated into approximate quintiles based on their helping game choices for nameless partners
(anonymous).
42Table 10: Regressing subjects’ baseline altruism on friends’ average baseline altruism
Dictator Game (1:3) Helping-Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. Nameless Decision of Friends 0.266 0.267 0.154 0.143
(0.17) (0.17) (0.78)∗ (0.78)†
Subject is Male -0.688 -0.308
(4.09) (0.60)
Percent Male of Subject’s Friends -0.370 -1.555
(6.16) (0.96)
Const. 6.445 6.929 7.115 7.806
(3.82)† (4.88) (0.83)∗∗ (0.90)∗∗
Obs. 186 186 746 746
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Tobit regressions of subjects’ baseline altruism (measured by their
nameless anonymous decision) on direct friends’ average baseline altruism. All possible direct friends pairs are
included.
Table 11: Regressing average allocation to partners whose direct friends made decisions for
them (anonymous treatment only) on their own baseline altruism and the average baseline
altruism of their friends (helping game)
Helping-Game
(1) (2)
Partner’s Nameless Decision ∈ [1,5] 1.048 0.357
(1.02) (0.96)
Partner’s Nameless Decision ∈ [6,12] 3.074 0.545
(0.93)∗∗ (0.91)
Partner’s Nameless Decision ∈ [13,15] 4.567 0.521
(0.92)∗∗ (0.98)
Partner’s Nameless Decision ∈ [16,30] 5.275 -0.384
(1.17)∗∗ (1.27)





Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a partner’s average allocation in anony-
mous treatment from decisions made by friends.
43Figure 4: Diﬀerence between number of passed tokens in the non-anonymous and anonymous
treatments in the dictator game by social distance
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For each decision maker/partner pair the diﬀerence between the number of tokens allocated in the non-
anonymous and the anonymous treatments was calculated. Bars show average diﬀerence grouped by decision
maker’s contribution level in anonymous treatment and by social distance.Figure 5: Diﬀerence between number of passed tokens in the non-anonymous and anonymous
treatments in the dictator game by network ﬂow
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For each decision maker/partner pair the diﬀerence between the number of tokens allocated in the non-
anonymous and the anonymous treatments was calculated. Bars show average diﬀerence grouped by decision





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 15: Eﬀects of “average time spent per week” and network ﬂow on decision makers’
generosity towards direct friends under non-anonymity (dictator game only)
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3)
Anonymous Pass 0.25 0.238 0.474
(0.063)∗∗ (0.211) (0.115)∗∗
Network Flow 0.676 -.024 0.155
(0.306)∗ (0.395) (0.262)
Average Time Spent per Week -.328 -.089 -.060
(0.368) (0.488) (0.323)
Const. 12.131 13.946 4.998
(3.640)∗∗ (5.493)∗ (3.286)
Obs. 206 206 206
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ :5 % ∗∗ :1 %
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens passed by the
decision maker to a direct friend in the non-anonymous dictator games. All speciﬁcations are estimated as Tobit
regressions with decision maker random eﬀects. “Anonymous Action” denotes the decision maker’s action for
the speciﬁc partner in the anonymous treatment. Network ﬂow is calculated for a circle of trust K = 2. Average
time spent per week is a categorical variable which takes the values 0 (less than half an hour per week), 1 (30
m i nt o1h o u r ) ,2( 1h o u rt o2h o u r s ) ,3( 2h o u r st o4h o u r s ) ,4( 4h o u r st o8h o u r s )a n d5( m o r et h a n8h o u r s
a week).
49